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ACTION [REDACTED] ION COPY

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PRECEDENCE

[REDACTED] 02 [REDACTED] MAY 73

SAGO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 02 [REDACTED] MAY 73 [REDACTED]

CITE SANTIAGO [REDACTED] SECTION 1 OF 2

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

1. ASSUME HQS DECISION TO PROCEED IN MANNER DESCRIBED IN REF B REFLECTS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, A LACK OF SOLID EVIDENCE THAT ARMED FORCES PREPARED TO MOVE IN DECISIVE MANNER AGAINST ALLENDE REGIME AND THAT OPPOSITION, ESPECIALLY PDC, WOULD SUPPORT SUCH A MOVE. IF OUR ASSUMPTION CORRECT, AGREE THAT NATURE AND FORM OF MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ALLENDE REGIME IS STILL EVOLVING, AS WELL AS THE ATTITUDES OF THE PDC IN THIS CONNECTION, HOWEVER, BOTH OF THESE KEY GROUPS ARE STEADILY MOVING TOWARD SOME KIND OF MILITARY INTERVENTION.

[REDACTED] PERHAPS IT WOULD BE BETTER TO POSTPONE PRESENTATION [REDACTED] TO [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] UNTIL WE GET MORE EVIDENCE THAT MILITARY IS PREPARING TO MOVE AND THAT SUCH A MOVE WOULD BE FAVORED BY ALL OPPOSITION PARTIES, INCLUDING PDC.

SECRET

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[REDACTED] free

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02 [REDACTED] MAY 73

SAGO [REDACTED]

PLS ADVISE,

2. IN CONNECTION WITH HQS CONSIDERATION OF ABOVE, BELIEVE FOLLOWING STATION VIEWS WHICH WERE PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO [REDACTED] MAY BE OF INTEREST.

3. [REDACTED] BUREAUCRATIC CONSIDERATIONS-ASIDE, DYNAMICS OF PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION CLEARLY POINT TO OPTION B OF [REDACTED] AS THE MOST INDICATED COURSE OF ACTION WE SHOULD PURSUE DURING FOLLOWING SIX TO NINE MONTHS. FIRST, THERE IS A GROWING ANTI-GMVT AMBIENCE IN ALL THREE MILITARY SERVICES AND AN INCREASING REALIZATION ON THEIR PART THAT SOME KIND OF ACTION BY THEM TO INTERVENE IN PRESENT SITUATION SOONER OR LATER WILL BE CALLED FOR. SECOND, THE DETERMINATION OF THE U.P. TO PUSH ITS REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM WITH RENEWED VIGOR AND THE COMMENSURATE RESPONSE OF THE OPPOSITION TO RESIST AND BLOCK THIS THRUST HAS CREATED THE CONDITIONS FOR AN ACUTE POLITICAL CRISIS. (WE ARE NOW IN THE BEGINNING PHASES OF THIS CRISIS WITH POLITICAL TENSION STEADILY RISING IN SPITE OF PERIODIC LULLS) THIRD, THE MOST MILITANT PARTS OF THE OPPOSITION; THE GRENALISTAS, THE PN, P&L, AND THE EL MERCURIO CHAIN OF NEWSPAPERS HAVE SET AS THEIR OBJECTIVE

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SAGO

CREATION OF CONFLICT AND CONFRONTATION WHICH WILL LEAD TO SOME SORT OF MILITARY INTERVENTION. NONE HAVE A CLEAR IDEA HOW THIS IS TO HAPPEN OR WHAT FORM IT WILL TAKE. EACH IN ITS OWN WAY IS TRYING TO COORDINATE ITS EFFORTS WITH MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES KNOWN TO THEM WHO SHARE THIS OBJECTIVE.

WHILE THE PDC IS NOT YET SEEKING MILITARY INTERVENTION AS AN ORGANIZATION (ALTHO CERTAIN LEADERS ALREADY FAVOR IT AND MORE CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO SO AS THE CRISIS DEEPENS), IT IS DETERMINED TO RESIST THE EXCESSES OF THE ALLENDE REGIME. AT THE MOMENT THE PDC IS IN DIRECT AND SERIOUS CONFLICT WITH THE U.P. WHILE THIS PHASE COULD PASS, WE EXPECT SIMILAR CONFRONTATIONS TO ARISE IN THE WEEKS AHEAD. EXCEPT FOR THE PDC AS AN ORGANIZATION, THE PLANNING FOCUS AND ACTION OF ALL THE OPPOSITION FORCES IS ON THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY AHEAD RATHER THAN ON 1976. IF WE ARE TO MAXIMIZE OUR INFLUENCE AND HELP THE OPPOSITION IN THE WAY IT NEEDS HELP, WE SHOULD WORK WITHIN THIS TREND RATHER THAN TRY TO OPPOSE AND COUNTER IT BY TRYING TO GET THE OPPOSITION AS A WHOLE TO FOCUS ON THE DISTANT AND TENUOUS GOAL OF 1976. IN SUM, WE BELIEVE THE ORIENTATION,

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FOCUS, AND THRUST OF OUR OPERATIONAL EFFORT SHOULD BE ON MILITARY INTERVENTION.

5. THE FORM THAT MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD TAKE IS STILL UNCLEAR, BUT WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE MORE CONSISTENT WITH CHILEAN SENSIBILITIES AND MAKEUP FOR INTERVENTION TO TAKE THE FORM OF REENTRANCE OF THE ARMED FORCES INTO THE GOVT AS A UNIFIED INSTITUTION. THEIR REENTRANCE COULD BE TRIGGERED BY SERIOUS INTERNAL CONFLICT AND CRISIS. IN SUCH A PERIOD OF CRISIS WE WOULD VISUALIZE THE COMMANDERS IN CHIEFS OF THE ARMED FORCES APPROACHING THE PRESIDENT EITHER AT HIS REQUEST OR ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE IN CONNECTION WITH THE CRISIS TO DISCUSS WHAT SHOULD BE DONE. THE ARMED FORCES AT THAT POINT WOULD BE PREPARED TO PRESENT THE PRESIDENT WITH SEVERAL VERY STIFF DEMANDS. HOWEVER, IF THE MILITARY DEMANDS WERE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE PRESIDENT, THE ARMED FORCES WOULD PROBABLY ALSO HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO TAKE OVER COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE GOVT AT THAT POINT.

6. [REDACTED] ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE COULD TAKE ONE OR TWO BASIC FORMS: (A) DELEGATE TO [REDACTED] THE PRINCIPAL TASK OF COORDINATING THE VARIOUS OPPOSITION

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SAGO

POWER GROUPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN OVERALL PLAN IN CONNECTION WITH A PREPARED TIMETABLE WITH _____ PLAYING A SUPPLEMENTARY ROLE THRU ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE KEY LEADERS OF THE CONSPIRATORIAL GROUP IN THE ARMY, _____ WE WOULD EXPECT A SERIOUS COUP GROUP OR LEADER TO WANT TO COMMUNICATE DIRECTLY WITH _____ AT SOME POINT, _____

_____ WOULD BE IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION TO CARRY OUT THIS ROLE. (B) - A SECOND ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE FOR _____ ITSELF TO PLAY THE DOMINANT COORDINATING ROLE. THIS WOULD INVOLVE, _____ WORKING THRU _____

_____ SINCE THERE ARE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES IN EACH APPROACH, THIS ASPECT WOULD NEED TO BE GIVEN MORE STUDY BEFORE A FINAL DECISION MADE AS TO WHICH WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND SECURE.

7. WHILE THE WHOLE FOCUS OF OUR EFFORT WOULD BE KEYED TO MILITARY INTERVENTION, WE WOULD NEED TO PROVIDE SOME FUNDS

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02 MAY 73

SAGO

02 MAY 73
CITE SANTIAGO FINAL SECTION OF 2
TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR,

TO THE POLITICAL PARTIES TO HELP THEM KEEP THEIR MEDIA OPERATIONS AND BASIC ORGANIZATIONS INTACT. TO KEEP UP THEIR MORALE, AND MAINTAIN THE CONFIDENCE OF PARTY LEADERS WHO HAVE BEEN WITTING OF OUR PAST SUPPORT. WE BELIEVE THE RANGE OF SUPPORT BEING SOUGHT FROM BY THE OF APPROX PER YEAR TO BE REASONABLE. WE WOULD EXPECT THE PN TO NEED ABOUT AND THE PDR/PIR ABOUT THE COST OF CARRYING OUT OUR EFFORT THRU

IS MORE DIFFICULT TO JUDGE BUT COULD BE IN THE RANGE.

8.

~~SECRET~~